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ARGUMENT 
I. QUESTIONS OF FACT REGARDING THE AGREEMENT 
BETWEEN MR. PAYNTER AND MR. ANDERSON PREVENT 
DETERMINATION OF ITS ENFORCEABILITY AS A MATTER OF LAW 
In Mr. Anderson's Opening Brief, he argued that there is a question of fact 
as to whether Dean Paynter had actual or apparent authority to bind the company 
through his representations regarding the Employment Agreement he provided Mr. 
Anderson in January 2008, particularly given the discussions regarding apparent 
authority in Zions First Nat'l Bank v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P.2d 1090, 1094-95 
(Utah 1988) and Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corporation, 16 P. 3d 555, 560 (Utah 
2000). Appellees respond to these arguments by maintaining that the 
Acknowledgment Agreement Mr. Anderson signed in November 2007, which 
stated that only Larry H. Miller can enter into an agreement with him and that any 
agreement must be in writing, means Mr. Paynter did not have authority to contract 
with him and is therefore dispositive of Mr. Anderson's breach of contract claims. 
Appellees' focus on the Acknowledgment Form exclusively is misplaced, given 
that the contract Mr. Anderson seeks to enforce is the Employment Agreement that 
Mr. Paynter provided him after he signed the Acknowledgment Form. It is this 
Employment Agreement that the court must examine for ambiguity, not the 
Acknowledgment Agreement. If the Employment Agreement is ambiguous, the 
4 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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( 
court can look to extrinsic evidence to determine the intent of the parties. Peterson 
v. The Sunrider Corp., 48 P. 3d 918, 925 (Utah 2002). That extrinsic evidence 
would include the Acknowledgment Agreement, but would also include the 
employee handbook, which conflicts with the Acknowledgment by stating that 
only the General Manager, which was Chris Baum, can contract on behalf of the 
company. Furthermore, the extrinsic evidence would include Mr. Paynter's 
representations to Mr. Anderson for months that he would be guaranteed a salary 
for three years regardless of what happened to the show, which Mr. Anderson 
waited to receive in writing before he went part-time in his teaching job — which 
clearly indicates that Mr. Anderson intended LHMCC to be bound by the contract. 
A. Dean Paynter's Actions Create a Question of Fact as to Whether he had 
Authority to Bind the Company 
As stated above, Appellees argue that Mr. Paynter did not have actual 
authority to contract with him because of the language in the Acknowledgement 
Form that states that only Larry H. Miller himself could enter into a contract with 
an employee. Appellee Brief at 12. Importantly, the Employment Agreement does 
not specify a signator for LHMCC, but simply lists the parties as Steve Anderson 
and Larry EL Miller Communications Corporation (R. 137-144), so the question is 
whether Mr. Paynter had the authority to negotiate the agreement with Mr. 
Anderson, not whether he could sign on behalf of the company. 
5 
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Appellees rely on several decisions from other states for their position that 
the court should look no further than the "four corners" of the Acknowledgment 
Form to determine that Mr. Paynter did not have the authority to enter into an 
agreement with Mr. Anderson (Appellee Brief at 12-13), but these cases are not 
persuasive here, given that Utah's case law regarding the scope of an "inquiry into 
whether an ambiguity exists in a contract" rejects "the strict application of the 'four 
corners' rule" espoused by some other jurisdictions. Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT 
App. 351, n. 14 (Utah 2005). 
Appellees also suggest that the language Mr. Anderson relies upon in 
Gillmor v. Macey (ie, "the better-reasoned approach is to consider the writing in 
light of the surrounding circumstances"), has been superseded by the decisions in 
Cafe Rio, Inc. v. Larkin-Gijford-Overton, LLC, 207 P.3d 1235 (Utah 2009), and 
Daines v. Vincent, 190 P.3d 1269 (Utah 2008). Appellee Brief at 13. This is 
incorrect. Cafe Rio and Daines v. Vincent pre-date the decision in Watkins v. Ford, 
in which this court used both the analyses from the Daines and Gillmor decisions, 
indicating they are consistent with each other. Watkins, 239 P. 3d 526, at 530, 532 
(Utah App. 2010). Watkins held that in determining whether a contract is 
ambiguous, the court looks at whether it is facially ambiguous, as set forth in 
Daines. Id. at 530. Even if a contract is not facially ambiguous, however, the 
6 
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< 
court may still look for "latent ambiguities" in light of the circumstances as a 
whole, pursuant to Gillmor: 
Under Utah law, if the initial review of the plain language of a 
contract, within its four corners, reveals no patently obvious < 
ambiguities, the inquiry into whether an ambiguity exists in a contract 
does not always end there. Utah's rules of contract interpretation allow 
courts to consider any relevant evidence to determine whether a latent 
ambiguity exists in contract terms that otherwise appear to be 
unambiguous. Gillmor v. Macey, 2005 UT App. 351, f 35, 121 P. 3d 
57. A latent ambiguity is 4[a]n ambiguity that does not readily appear 
in the language of a document, but instead arises from a collateral 
matter when the document's terms are applied or executed.' Black's 
Law Dictionary 93 (9th ed.2009). Thus, if a contract, 'while on its 
face appealing to be certain, would open up an ambiguity when 
attempts were made to apply it to the subject-matter, then such 
ambiguity could be resolved by evidence of what meaning the parties 
themselves intended to invest such terms.' Bamberger Co. v. Certified 
Prods., Inc., 88 Utah 194, 48 P.2d 489,494 (1935); see also Fox Film 
Corp. v. Ogden Theatre Co., 82 Utah 279, 17 P.2d 294,296 (1932) 
("One well-recognized exception to the [parol evidence] rule is that 
extrinsic evidence, parol or otherwise, is admissible to explain a latent 
ambiguity in a writing. This does not mean that terms or conditions 
may be inserted into or taken out of the writing by direct oral 
assertions, but it does mean that the court may receive evidence of 
such surrounding facts as will enable it to look upon the transaction 
through the eyes of the parties thereto and thereby know what they 
understood or intended the ambiguous word or provisions to mean.') 
Watkins, 239 P. 3d at 532. In Watkins, the court found that latent ambiguities were 
caused by events that occurred after the contract at issue was written (the renaming 
of the car referenced in the contract). Id. 
Here, the contract at issue is the Employment Agreement, which Mr. Paynter 
provided to Mr. Anderson in January 2008, after Mr. Anderson received the 
7 
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handbook and the Acknowledgment Form. In order to determine whether the 
Employment Agreement is a contract, Appellees argue that the court should look 
no further than the language of the Acknowledgment Form, and find that Mr. 
Paynter did not have authority to enter into the Employee Agreement with Mr. 
Anderson. Appellees effectively suggest that the court take a narrow look at the 
circumstances of this case, an approach that is rejected in Gillmor and Watkins. 
Rather, Utah case law favors consideration of all the surrounding circumstances, 
which in this case includes the handbook that conflicts with the Acknowledgment 
Form, as well as Mr. Paynter's representations to Mr. Anderson that conflict with 
both the Acknowledgment Form and the handbook. These circumstances create a 
latent ambiguity in all the documents, which must be resolved by a fact-finder. 
Mr. Anderson also argued in his Opening Brief that the Utah Supreme 
Court's decision in Shattuck-Owen v. Snowbird Corporation, 16 P. 3d 555, 560 
(Utah 2000) is instructive here, because it holds that "when a representative of a 
company holds himself out as someone who can bind the company, even with a 
written statement to the contrary, there exists a material issue of fact as to whether 
that person has the authority to contract on behalf of the company. Opening Brief 
at 24. Appellees argue that Shattuck-Owen does not stand for this proposition. 
Appellee Brief at 16. Rather, Appellees argue that the decision in Shattuck-Owen, 
which found that there was a question of fact as to whether the employer's Human 
8 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Resource Director had actual or apparent authority to contract on the employer's 
behalf, turned on the fact that the contract disclaimer in that case "was limited, 
because it stated only that no one but the CEO had the authority to 'alter the at-will 
relationship.'" Appellee Brief at 16. This limited view of the opinion is not 
supported by its language. The decision did note the limited disclaimer, and stated, 
"the signed statement appears to have no application to the instant case." Shattuck-
Owen, 16 P. 3d at 560. The court's analysis, however, appears to have relied at 
least as much on the Human Resource Director's position and the latitude the 
employer gave her, as deduced from the following passage: 
Moreover, the alleged facts, viewed in the light most favorable to 
Shattuck-Owen suggest Roberts possessed authority to contract for 
Snowbird. Foremost, Roberts was Snowbird's Human Resources 
Director—the person presumptively in charge of explaining and, 
when necessary, arranging for employee benefits. In addition, 
Snowbird management permitted Roberts to act as the company 
representative in attempting to address Shattuck-Owenfs therapy 
needs. At the very least, these facts raise a genuine question as to 
Roberts's implied and/or apparent authority to act for Snowbird with 
respect to an employee benefits issue. See, e.g., Zions First Nat 7 Bank 
v. Clark Clinic Corp., 762 P. 2d 1090, 1094-95 (Utah 1988) 
(discussing implied and apparent authority). Because issues of 
material fact remain regarding Roberts' authority to contract on 
Snowbird's behalf, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment 
on that ground. 
Id. Accordingly, Shattuck-Owen's analysis is applicable here, since Mr. Paynter 
was "the only one . . . that seemed to be in charge of anything," he negotiated Mr. 
Anderson's salary with him, and was permitted by LHMCC to act as its 
9 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
representative in interfacing with Mr. Anderson about the Employment Agreement. 
Opening Brief at Statement of Facts, ff 3, 11, 14-18, 26-27,29. These facts 
suggest that he had apparent authority to contract with Mr. Anderson. 
B. The Language in the Acknowledgment Form Regarding Signed 
Contracts is Not Controlling Given Mr. Pay liter's Subsequent 
Representations to Mr. Anderson that the Employment Agreement Was 
Enforceable Without Signatures 
Appellees effectively argue that once an employee has been given a form 
document that states that any agreement must be in writing, this language is 
controlling for the remainder of the employer-employee relationship, regardless of 
any subsequent representations the company or its agents make, including a 
specific representation that a particular subsequent agreement is enforceable 
without signatures. Appellee Brief at 17-18. This theory has no legal support, nor 
does it make logical sense. 
Appellees rely on Engineering Assoc, v. Irving Place Assoc, 622 P.2d 784, 
787 (Utah 1980), but that case is factually distinguishable, and therefore not 
applicable here. In Engineering Assoc, the respondent sought financing through 
the appellants for a mortgage, in which the application for the mortgage stated, 
"This agreement may not be changed orally," and was contingent upon a written 
acceptance of the agreement and a payment of $23,000. Engineering Assoc, 622 
P. 2d 785-86. Because the respondent did not pay the $23,000, the court 
determined that it did not accept the agreement, and the agreement was not 
10 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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enforceable. Id. at 787. Likewise, the decision in R J. Daum Constr. Co. v. Child, 
cited by Appellees, also reviews negotiations by the parties regarding one 
agreement, and determines that there was no meeting of the minds that resulted in 
an enforceable contract. 122 Utah 194, 199-203 (1952). These cases are not 
persuasive here, where we are dealing with two separate documents provided to 
Mr. Anderson months apart, and where the initial representation that any 
agreement must be in writing was specifically refuted by Mr. Paynter when he 
presented the second agreement. 
Appellees argue that the fact that LHMCC provided Mr. Anderson with the 
Acknowledgment Form stating that all contracts must be in writing and signed 
means "any such modification of the signature requirement had to be in writing 
and signed by all parties as well." Appellee Brief at 18. This argument fails for 
two reasons. First, the initial "signature requirement" was not signed by Larry 
Miller, and therefore, it should not be considered a binding agreement pursuant to 
Appellees' theory. Second, to the extent it is a binding agreement, Mr. Paynter 
subsequently specifically refuted it. Had Mr. Paynter not made explicit reference 
to the signature requirement and stated it was unnecessary, it might be reasonable 
. . . ' . • ' * » ' 
to conclude that LHMCC's intent to be bound only by a signed document was still 
in place, but instead, Mr. Paynter directly refuted such an assertion, and in fact, 
physically stopped Mr. Anderson from signing the document, making clear to Mr. 
l i Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Anderson that the company did not require a signature. (To the extent Mr. Paynter 
did this in order to entice Mr. Anderson to work for LHMCC, and to provide 
LHMCC with a way to avoid being bound by those promises, this supports Mr. 
Anderson's claim for fraud.) 
Appellees have presented no case law that supports its position that a 
document that states that all agreements between parties must be in writing is 
controlling for the duration of the relationship, despite subsequent representations 
to the contrary. Furthermore, Mr. Anderson submits that such a rule would 
encourage injustices, as employers could always provide such disclaimers to 
employees in their initial documents as a way of avoiding liability on any 
subsequent promises to the unwitting employee (precisely as Appellees seek to do 
here). 
C. The Employment Agreement is Sufficiently Definite Regarding Intent of 
the Parties 
Appellees argue that the Employment Agreement at issue here is not 
enforceable because it is incomplete and indefinite. Appellee Brief at 19. 
Appellees made this argument before the district court in their Motion for 
Summary Judgment (R. 68-69), but the district court did not include them as a 
basis for the dismissal of Mr. Anderson's claims. Accordingly, it is not one of the 
rulings on appeal. To the extent this court finds that Appellee's point merits 
consideration as a matter of law, Mr. Anderson submits that the blanks in the 
12 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Agreement do not concern the essential terms, and therefore, the Agreement is 
enforceable. 
Missing or uncertain terms in a contract do not necessarily render it 
unenforceable. "It is not necessary that the contract itself contain all the particulars 
of the agreement. The crucial question is whether the parties agreed on the 
essential terms of the contract." C&Y Corp. v. General Biometrics, Inc., 896 P. 2d 
47, 52 (Utah App. 1995). "Whether or not the [missing term] was essential to the 
contract requires an examination of the entire agreement and the circumstances 
under which the agreement was entered into." Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 78 P. 3d 600, 
602 (Utah 2003) {citing Cessna Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 575 P. 2d 1048, 1050 (Utah 
1978). 
A contract that is ambiguous due to uncertain unessential terms may be 
clarified by the court based upon extrinsic evidence that demonstrates the parties' 
intentions. Peterson, supra, 48 P. 3d at 925 (Utah 2002). "Where a contract is 
ambiguous, summary judgment is appropriate only if the evidence, when viewed in 
the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, leaves no genuine issues of fact to 
beresolved." M a t 9 2 7 . 
Here, the essential terms regarding salary and the three-year term of the 
agreement are included. According to Mr. Anderson, the essential terms of the 
agreement he demanded from LHMCC was that he would be guaranteed a salary 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
for at least three years. Mr. Paynter acknowledges being aware that Mr. Anderson 
was expecting a three-year contract of employment. R. 10, 184, 195. The 
Agreement presented here contained some blanks, but was unequivocal on the 
amount of his Mr. Anderson's salary and the three-year guarantee.1 For instance, 
with respect to the "Term" of the Agreement, it provides that it begins November 
26, 2007, that Mr. Anderson will receive a 10% raise each year, and that it ends in 
2010; it then requires written notice to Mr. Anderson if LHMCC intended to 
continue it beyond that period, through the 2010-2011 year of the contract. R. 138. 
The Agreement further stated that although LHMCC could terminate Mr. 
Anderson's employment with or without Cause, if the Company terminated him 
without Cause (as defined elsewhere in the Agreement, for reasons that are 
inapplicable here), Mr. Anderson "shall be entitled to the average annual salary 
that would have been paid to Anderson over the entire remaining Term of this 
Agreement " R. 140-141, f 10.3. 2 These are the terms that both parties agree 
1
 As for the blanks, Mr. Anderson testified that he understood that the blanks in the 
contract next to when his raises would go into effect were because the start date 
kept changing. He understood, nonetheless, that he would receive a 10% raise 
after he worked for one year, then another raise after the second year. R. 203-204. 
2
 Notably, the Agreement also states that "The parties hereto represent and warrant 
to each other that they have the full right and power to enter into this Agreement.. 
. ," (R. 142, f 14) refuting any suggestion that Mr. Paynter did not have the 
apparent authority to negotiate the contract with Mr. Anderson. 
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that Mr. Anderson was concerned with, and therefore, the essential terms are 
contained in the agreement. Accordingly, the Agreement is not so indefinite as to 
render it unenforceable as a matter of law. Any uncertainties created by the blanks 
are not material, and could be resolved based on the parties' intent. 
H. THE ACKNOWLEDGMENT AGREEMENT DOES NOT 
PRECLUDE MR. ANDERSON'S PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND FRAUD 
CLAIMS 
Appellees argue that Mr. Anderson's promissory estoppel claim fails for two 
reasons: 1) LHMCC could not be bound by Mr. Paynter's representations to Mr. 
Anderson; and 2) Mr. Anderson could not have reasonably relied on those 
representations. Appellee Brief at 20. As to the first point, Mr. Anderson submits 
that it is irrelevant to Mr. Anderson's promissory estoppel claim, as it does not 
relate to an element of the claim. See Appellee Brief at 21. 
As to the second point, Appelles argue that Mr. Anderson's reliance upon 
Mr. Paynter's representations was not reasonable in light of the language in the 
Acknowledgment Form that stated that Larry Miller was the only person who 
could contract on behalf of the company and such agreement had to be in writing. 
Appellees rely on the decision in Gold Standard, Inc. v. Getty Oil Co., 915 P. 2d 
1060, 1068 (Utah 1996) ("a party cannot reasonably rely upon oral statements by 
the opposing party in light of contrary written information"). The language quoted 
in Gold Standard is inapplicable here, however, because in that case, the oral 
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statements upon which the plaintiff purported to rely came first, but were 
specifically refuted in several subsequent written communications that were 
intended to address the plaintiffs misunderstanding of the oral communication, 
and "indicated that the situation was not as GSI understood it to be." Id. at 1067-
1068. In those circumstances, the court held that the plaintiff "could not 
reasonably rely on that [oral] promise in light of the correspondence following that 
meeting." Id. at 1067. This is quite different from Mr. Anderson's case, in which 
Mr. Paynter specifically refuted the stated requirement that an agreement be signed 
and in writing, not only by assuring Mr. Anderson that "the lawyers" said the 
agreement was enforceable, but also by physically restraining him from signing the 
agreement when he started to do so. 
Appellees' sole argument against Mr. Anderson's fraud claim, both here and 
before the district court, rests on the same point raised against his promissory 
estoppel claim - that he could not have reasonably relied on Mr. Paynter's 
representations in light of Gold Standard. As stated above, Gold Standard is 
inapplicable. Moreover, there is substantial evidence that Mr. Anderson's reliance 
on Mr. Paynter's representations was reasonable, given the many times he had told 
Mr. Paynter that he required a three-year salary guarantee, and Mr. Paynter's 
repeated assurances that he would receive such a guarantee. Accordingly, 
Appellees have failed to meet their burden to "affirmatively provide factual 
16 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
( 
evidence establishing that there is no genuine issue of material fact," such that they 
are not entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law on Mr. Anderson's fraud 
claim. Orvis v. Johnson, 177 P. 3d 600, 604 (Utah 2008). 
i n . MR. ANDERSON'S CLAIM FOR BREACH OF THE COVENANT 
OF GOOD FAITH AND FAIR DEALING DERIVES FROM THE 
COVENANT IMPLICIT IN THE EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENT 
Appellees argue that Mr. Anderson's claim for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing "fails because there was no such contract 
[for a salary guarantee for three years] in the first place." Appellee Brief at 25. 
Appellees rely upon the decision inBrehany v. Nordstrom, Inc., 812 P. 2d 49, 55 
(Utah 1991). The Brehany decision is not persuasive here, however, since the 
court in that case relied upon the fact that the employer had made no agreement to 
limit its ability to terminate employees at-will, so the court could not imply such a 
limitation based upon an implied covenant. Id. at 55-56. Here, the parties do not 
dispute that Mr. Anderson was at-will. The terms of his employment were 
changed, however, by the Employment Agreement Mr. Paynter provided him, 
which he knew Mr. Anderson was expecting, which Mr. Anderson waited for 
before going part-time at his teaching job, and which Mr. Paynter told him was 
enforceable without signatures and stopped him from signing. This Employment 
Agreement, like all contracts, express or implied, carries with it an implied duty of 
good faith and fair dealing, pursuant to which "each party impliedly promises that 
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he will not intentionally or purposely do anything which will destroy or injure the 
other party's right to receive the fruits of the contract." St. Benedict's Dev. v. St. 
Benedict's Hosp., 811 P. 2d 194,199 (Utah 1991). Certainly, in light of all the 
facts in this case, there is a question as to whether Appellees purposely did 
anything to destroy Mr. Anderson's rights to the fruits of the Employment 
Agreement. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and in Mr. Anderson's Opening Brief, the 
district court erred in dismissing all of Mr. Anderson's claims on summary 
judgment. Mr. Anderson hereby requests that this Court reverse the district court's 
ruling on all of his claims, and remand the case for a trial on the merits. 
DATED this 22nd day of August, 2011. 
HOLLINGSWORTH LAW OFFICE, LLC 
April L. Hollingsworth 
Attorney for Appellant 
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